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Abstract
Often a set of imperatives or norms seems satisfiable from the outset, but conflicts arise when
ways to fulfill all are ruled out by unfortunate circumstances. Semantic methods to handle normative
conflicts were devised by B. van Fraassen and J.F. Horty, but these are not sensitive to circumstances.
The present paper extends these resolution mechanisms to circumstantial inputs, defines dyadic de-
ontic operators accordingly, and provides a sound and (weakly) complete axiomatic system for such
deontic semantics.
 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Logic of imperatives; Deontic logic; Conflict of norms
1. The question of normative conflicts
Do moral conflicts exist? The orthodox belief in the 1950’s was that such conflicts only
exist at first glance—the seemingly conflicting obligations arising from the application of
merely incomplete principles. Instead, what is actually obligatory must be determined by
a careful moral deliberation that involves considering and weighing all relevant facts and
reasons, and cannot produce conflicting outcomes. Among the first that came to reject this
view were E.J. Lemmon [27] and B. Williams [43]: Lemmon observed that in cases of true
moral dilemma, one does not know the very facts needed to determine which obligation
might outweigh the other. Williams argued in reductio that if, in case of conflicting oughts,
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acted as one should have are out of place and one should not mind getting into similar
situations again. To avoid the derivation of the ought of a contradiction from two oughts
of equal weight but with contradictory contents, Williams argued that deontic logic should
give up the agglomeration principle
(C) OA∧OB → O(A∧B).
Lemmon had no such qualms: he advocated dropping the Kantian Principle ‘ought implies
can’
(KP) OA → A,
thus allowing for obligations to bring about the impossible, and concluded:
“I should like to see a proper discussion of the arguments that go to resolve moral
dilemmas, because I do not believe that this is an area of total irrationality, though I do
not believe that a traditional logical approach (the logic of imperatives, deontic logic,
and whatnot) will do either.”
Regarding commands and legal norms, G.H. von Wright [45, Chapter 7], like H. Kelsen
[23, p. 211] at the time, excluded the coexistence of conflicting norms from the same
source: The giving of two conflicting norms is the expression of an irrational will; it is a
performative self-contradiction and as such a pure fact that fails to create a norm. E. Stenius
[40] and later C.E. Alchourrón and E. Bulygin [1] rejected this view: A system of norms
that is impossible to obey might be unreasonable and its norm-giver blameworthy, but its
existence does not constitute a logical contradiction—conflicts are ubiquitous in systems of
positive law and logic cannot deny this fact. In his later theory, von Wright [49] concedes
that existing normative systems may or may not be contradiction-free, and reformulates
deontic principles as meta-norms for consistent norm-giving. Kelsen [24] later came to
view logic as inapplicable to law.
2. Van Fraassen’s proposal and Horty’s variation
2.1. Van Fraassen’s operator OF
Not taking sides, pro or contra the existence of genuine normative conflicts, but arguing
that the view in favor seems at least tenable, B. van Fraassen [11] took up the burden of
finding plausible logical semantics that could accommodate conflicting obligations. The
intended semantics should accept the possible truth of two deontic sentences OA, O¬A
without committing the norm-subject to the absurd by making O(A ∧ ¬A) true, for van
Fraassen wanted to keep the Kantian Principle. Given the existence of certain imperatives
in force, i.e., imperatives that are left as valid, relevant, not overridden, etc. by some un-
specified deliberation process, van Fraassen’s idea was to make these imperatives part of
the logical model, and to describe something as obligatory if it serves to satisfy some, not
necessarily all, imperatives. Formally, let I be the set of imperatives in force, B be the set
of possible states of affairs, and i+ ⊆ B be the possible states of affairs where the impera-
tive i ∈I is considered fulfilled. Let ‖A‖ ⊆ B be the set of possible states of affairs where
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tives that are fulfilled in the state of affairs v: score(v) = {i ∈ I | v ∈ i+}. Van Fraassen
then defines:
[Df-F] OFA is true iff ∃v ∈ ‖A‖: ∀v′ ∈ ‖¬A‖: score(v)  score(v′).
So A is obligatory if and only if (iff) there is some score that can be achieved when A is
true, which is not included in any score that could be achieved when ¬A is true. In other
words, A is obligatory iff there are imperatives that can only be (collectively) satisfied
when A is true, but not when A is false.
By slightly changing the viewpoint, van Fraassen’s proposal might also be described
in the following way: let I be a set not of imperatives, but of indicative sentences in the
language LBL of some basic logic BL. The motivation is that I contains one sentence A
for each imperative i in force that is true in exactly those states of affairs in which the
imperative is fulfilled, i.e., ‖A‖ = i+. BL is assumed to be compact and the turnstile in
Γ 
BL A means a classical consequence relation that characterizes BL, Γ ⊆ LBL, A ∈
LBL. Let the remainder set Γ ⊥ A be the set of all maximal subsets that do not derive A,
i.e., of all Γ ′ ⊆ Γ such that (i) Γ ′ BL A, and (ii) there is no Γ ′′ such that Γ ′ ⊂ Γ ′′ ⊆ Γ
and Γ ′′  A. Then Df-F is equivalent to Df-F*( means an arbitrary tautology):1
[Df-F∗] OFA is true iff ∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬: I ′ 
BL A
So A is obligatory iff it is derivable from a maximally consistent subset of I . So something
is obligatory if it is required for doing ‘the most’: if it is necessitated by a strategy to fulfill
so many imperatives that no one who satisfies these as well could satisfy more. While a
parallel operation for belief change is known as ‘credulous reasoning’, to call it ‘orthodox’
might seem more appropriate: the agent is not released from any of her obligations as long
as they are fulfillable, even if this fulfillment is at the expense of violating other norms.
To see how van Fraassen’s semantics work, first let I = {A,B}, where A and B are
supposedly contingent and independent. There are no conflicts, I is consistent and OFA,
OFB and OF (A∧B) are all true since I derives A, B and A∧B . Thus agglomeration of
contents is permitted so long as the underlying imperatives do not conflict. For the case of
conflict, change I into {A ∧ C,B ∧ ¬C}; OFA and OFB are true since A and B derive
from the maximally consistent sets {A∧C} and {B ∧¬C}, but OF (C ∧¬C) is false since
no consistent subset derives C ∧ ¬C. The same is true for OF (A ∧ B) though {A ∧ B} is
consistent: the truth of A∧B is not necessary for maximal norm satisfaction.
An axiomatic system DLF that is (weakly) complete with regard to van Fraassen’s se-
mantics is defined by the following axiom-schemes, in addition to BL-instances and modus
ponens (cf. [17, Section 5], ⊥ means an arbitrary contradiction, and the index ‘F ’ here and
below indicates that the deontic operators occurring in the axiom scheme are thus indexed):
(MF ) OF (A∧B) → (OFA∧OFB)
(PF ) ¬OF⊥
(NF ) OF
(ExtF ) If 
BL A ↔ B then 
DL OFA ↔ OFB
1 Cf. Horty’s [20, Theorem 2].
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not seem axiomatizable: object language does not reveal whether particular A and B of
some OFA and OFB are derived from the demands of imperatives that do not conflict and
so OF (A∧B) should be supported.2
2.2. The skeptical operator OS
The invalidation of the agglomeration principle by van Fraassen’s semantics did not
make them popular (cf. Donagan [8, p. 298]). Moreover, let a PF -operator expressing
permission be defined in the usual way as PFA =def ¬OF¬A, and consider again I =
{A∧C,B ∧ ¬C}: then OF (A∧C) is true, and so is OF¬C. Applying (MF ) and (ExtF ),
OF¬(A∧C) must be true, hence PF (A∧C) is false. So not even the obligatory is always
permitted, which seems strange (cf. Jacquette [22]).
In reaction to the dismissal of the agglomeration principle, Donagan [8] and Brink [7]
have claimed that even if there could be a normative demand for A and a conflicting de-
mand for B , with 
BL A → ¬B , it need not follow that the norm-subject has an obligation
to realize A and an obligation to realize B . Rather, there should just be a disjunctive oblig-
ation to realize A or B . Given competing normative standards of equal weight, the strategy
of this reasoning is not to trust a single standard, but to consider obligatory only what all
standards demand. Let I be as before. Varying van Fraassen’s truth definition, Horty [20]
has formalized this ‘skeptical’ ought as follows:3
[Df-S] OSA is true iff ∀I ′ ∈ I⊥¬: I ′ 
BL A
So OSA is true iff A is derivable from all maximally consistent subsets of I . ‘skeptical’
is the term used in the epistemic-oriented literature, yet ‘legalist’ also seems fitting, since
a norm violation is never pronounced as obligatory even if it is inevitable. This does not
let the agent off the hook: by doing what is obligatory in this sense, a maximum of norms
will, by necessity, get satisfied.
Let again I = {A ∧ C,B ∧ ¬C}. OSA and OSB are false and OS(A ∨ B) is true: just
A∨ B , but neither A nor B are derived by both of the two consistent subsets {A∧C} and
{B ∧ ¬C}. PS(A∧C) is also true: A,C were assumed to be contingent and independent,
so the maximally consistent subset {A ∧ C} ⊆ I does not derive ¬(A ∧ C). So what is
OF -obligatory is at least PS -permitted.
A complete axiomatic system DLS is defined by the axiom-schemes (MS ), (CS ), (PS ),
(NS ), and (ExtS ), together with BL-instances and modus ponens. Since the truth definitions
for OFA and OSA merely depend on a set I and BL, mixed expressions such as OFA ∧
¬OSA are meaningful and may be accepted as well-formed. Then
(CSF) OSA∧OFB → OF (A∧B)
2 So agglomeration requires some consistency check of the underlying imperatives’ contents. Van der Torre and
Tan [41,42] proposed a two-phase deontic logic, where ‘consistent aggregation’ must take place before weaken-
ing. For the present imperative semantics, I suggested a bimodal approach in [17] with an operator O2 that ‘more
directly talks about the imperatives’. For comparisons and a new proposal cf. [15].
3 More in parallel to van Fraassen’s original definition, one may equivalently define:
[Df-S∗] OSA is true iff ∀v ∈ ‖¬A‖: ∃v′ ∈ ‖A‖: score(v) ⊂ score(v′)
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the axiom scheme (CSF), all instances of BL-theorems and modus ponens—is sound and
(weakly) complete (cf. [17, Section 6]).
3. Predicaments and dyadic deontic logic
Arguing for the possibility of moral conflicts, R. Barcan Marcus [33] explained:
“Under the single principle of promise keeping, I might make two promises in all good
faith and reason that they will not conflict, but then they do, as a result of circumstances
that were unpredictable and beyond my control”.
Note that there is no conflict at the outset: any dilemma could have been averted by not
promising anything. Moreover, there might have been some point in time at which keeping
both promises was possible: having 500 $ with me and another 1000 $ in the office, I
promise Raoul and Johnny 500 $ each on Saturday with every intention of paying them on
Monday, only to find out that the office had been burglarized over the weekend. Donagan
[8] argues that this is not a genuine conflict, because three resolving principles apply:
(i) one must not make promises one cannot or must not keep, (ii) all promises are made with
the implicit condition that they are void if they cannot or must not be kept, (iii) one must
not make promises when one does not believe that the other party has fully understood (ii).
But as I well knew beforehand, neither Raoul nor Johnny are going to let me off the hook,
regardless of what may happen at the office. According to (iii), I was wrong to make the
promises. So am I entitled to break them (both)?—We have here what G.H. von Wright
[48] terms a ‘predicament’: a situation from which there is no permitted way out, but to
which there also is no permitted inlet. The normative order is consistent, it is only through
one’s own fault that one finds oneself in a predicament.4 Von Wright then asks:
“The man in a predicament will, of necessity, react in some way or other, either do
something or remain passive. Even though every reaction of his will be a sin, is it not
reasonable to think that there is yet something he ought to do rather than anything else?
To deny this would be to admit that it makes, deontically, no difference what he does.
But is this reasonable? (. . .) If all our choices are between forbidden things, our duty is
to choose the least bad thing”. [48, p. 80]
4 That predicaments only arise from an agent’s own faults, and not through misfortune or the wrongdoings of
others, is a view von Wright and Donagan ascribe to Thomas Aquinas, but this does not seem quite correct: in
the discussion of oaths (Summa Theologica II.II Qu. 89 art. 7 ad 2), Thomas considers the objection that it would
sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle to it, if one were to fulfill what one has sworn to do—so oaths
need not always be binding. In answering, Thomas distinguishes oaths that are unlawful from the outset, where a
man sinned in swearing, and oaths that could be lawful at the outset but lead to an evil result through some new
and unforeseen emergency: fulfillment of such oaths is unlawful.
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ing that it ought to be that A given C is true. By accepting all instances of (DD-)
O(A/) → P(A/) as a logical truth in [48], von Wright dismisses an inconsistent nor-
mative system as ‘conceptual absurdity’: if A is obligatory on tautological conditions (i.e.,
unconditionally obligatory), then there cannot be a likewise unconditional obligation to the
contrary. Although von Wright originally used the stronger (DD) O(A/C) → P(A/C) for
arbitrary C (axiom A1 of the ‘old system’ in [44], and axiom B1 of the ‘new system’ in
[46]), he later turned against it, arguing that while morality makes no conflicting claims,
it is not a logical impossibility that conflicting promises can give rise to predicaments.5
Dyadic operators seem essential for even making this distinction.6
Turning object language oughts into a special sort of conditionals does not necessarily
imply a change in the formalization of the background imperatives: consider the set I =
{(¬C ∨ A), (¬C ∨ ¬A)}, corresponding to background imperatives in the usual way. I is
also its single maximally consistent subset, which derives ¬C, so OF¬C and OS¬C are
both true. But a single standard is no longer available once C becomes true: the imperatives
have not all been fulfilled (otherwise one would not be in condition C), and any maximal
set of imperatives that is consistent with the given circumstances cannot contain all. So the
proposal is to call A obligatory in case C iff A is necessary for doing ‘the most’ that can
be achieved, given the truth of C. Formally:
[Df-DF] OF (A/C) iff ∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
BL A
So OF (A/C) is true iff there is some set, among the maximal subsets of I consistent
with C, that together with C derives A. This is obviously a conservative extension of the
definition given for the unconditional case, so we may define OFA =def OF (A/).
If a cautious, disjunctive approach were appropriate for cases of conflict, then it would
be hard to see why predicaments should be treated differently: that conflicts must be ac-
counted for at the outset, but analogues of Buridan’s ass cannot be brought about by fate
or unpredictable human nature, would hardly be plausible. Distrusting any single standard,
such an approach would accept, given the circumstances C, only what is necessary by any
standard that could still be met—no crying over spilled milk. Formally:
[Df-DS] OS(A/C) iff ∀I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
BL A
So OS(A/C) is true iff all the maximal subsets of I consistent with C derive A, given the
truth of C. This is again a conservative extension of the unconditional case, so one may
define OSA =def OS(A/).
After a comparison of the above definitions with similar approaches namely in the study
of nonmonotonic reasoning, I will give an axiomatic dyadic deontic system DDL{F,S},
which I prove to be sound and (only) weakly complete with respect to the above semantics.
5 Cf. [47], [48, pp. 36, 81, 89].
6 Below, I extend the treatment of conflicts to the area of predicaments, and do not follow von Wright in ruling
out conflicts. However, this can easily be done by axiomatically adding (DD-) to the system presented below.
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Though the truth definitions introduced in the preceding section naturally extend the
proposals of van Fraassen and Horty for dealing with normative conflicts to the dyadic
context and the related problem of predicaments, and though their resolution mechanisms
are not exactly new (cf. below), there has not been much discussion of these concepts
in the deontic logic literature. Notably, Horty’s own dyadic operator in [21] is defined
with respect to (simply) maximally non-conflicting sets of prima facie oughts, and it is
disregarded that their joint demands may now be inconsistent with the situation. But the
more general literature on nonmonotonic reasoning offers a range of parallel concepts.
Regarding OS , the most obvious parallel is Kratzer and Lewis’s premise semantics in
[25] and [30] which has a set of formulas H (the premises) to define counterfactuals in
much the same way as the set I is used here in the definition of deontic conditionals.
Considering Kratzer’s definition, and setting aside the world-relativity of H , let SH,C =
{H ′ ⊆ H | H ′ BL ¬C} be the set of all subsets of H that are, according to some basic
logic BL, consistent with C. A counterfactual conditional → is defined in the following
way:
H |= C →A iff ∀H ′ ∈SH,C : ∃H ′′ ∈SH,C : H ′ ⊆ H ′′,H ′′ ∪ {C} 
BL A
In other words, C → A is true iff each set in SH,C has a superset in SH,C that implies
C → A.7 The truth definition is tailored for a basic logic that may fail compactness and so
accommodates sets H with ever-larger C-consistent subsets, but no maximal ones. Here,
BL was assumed to be compact, and we obtain:
Observation 1 (Relation to premise semantics). For any set I ⊆LBL:
I |= OS(A/C) iff I |= C →A
Proof. Left-to-right. Suppose that C → A is false, so there is some I ′ ∈ SI,C : ∀I ′′ ∈
SI,C : if I ′ ⊆ I ′′ then I ′′ ∪ {C} BL A. I ′ BL ¬C, so by definition there is some I ′′ ∈
I⊥¬C such that I ′ ⊆ I ′′. So I ′′ ∪ {C} BL A, so ¬∀I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
BL A and so
OS(A/C) is false.
Right-to-left. Suppose OS(A/C) is false, so ∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} BL A. Then I ′ ∈
SI,C , and by definition of I⊥¬C there is no other I ′′ ∈SI,C : I ′ ⊆ I ′′, so ∀I ′′ ∈SI,C : if
I ′ ⊆ I ′′ then I ′′ ∪ {C} BL A, and C →A is false.
Then, the definition of OS parallels that of a consequence relation associated to a Poole
system without constraints [35]: This has two sets Γ,∆ of formulas, the facts and the
defaults. A scenario is a set ∆′ ∪ Γ such that ∆′ ⊆ ∆ and ∆′ ∪ Γ BL ⊥. A ‘maximal
7 Lewis’s [30] variation requires this property only of non-empty H ′ ∈ SH,C . This corresponds to replacing
I ′ ∪ {C} 
BL A in the truth definition for OS with ∃B1, . . . ,Bn ∈ I ′: 
BL (B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bn ∧C) → A to produce
a regular instead of a normal operator. Lewis notes (p. 233) that for deontic conditionals, the premises of the
premise semantics might be understood to be “something that ought to hold”, so he is to be credited for the
imperative semantics employed here.
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⊥, and for all ∆′′ ⊆ ∆, if ∆′ ⊂ ∆′′ then ∆′′ ∪ {Γ } 
PL ⊥. Cn being BL-consequence, a
prediction A from the facts Γ and the defaults ∆ is then defined as:
Γ |∼skept(∆) A =def A ∈
⋂
∆′∈E(Γ )
Cn(∆′ ∪ Γ )
So A is predicted from Γ and ∆ if all maximal scenarios derive A. Likewise, a ‘credulous
prediction’ can be defined as
Γ |∼cred(∆) A =def A ∈
⋃
∆′∈E(Γ )
Cn(∆′ ∪ Γ )
(cf. Brass [5] for the analogy and notation). The following is then immediate:
Observation 2 (Relation to Poole systems). For any set I ⊆LBL:
I |= OS(A/C) iff {C} |∼skept(I ) A
I |= OF (A/C) iff {C} |∼cred(I ) A
Regarding the OF -operator, it is perhaps not quite as obvious that its corresponding PF -
operator is closely related to the ‘X-logics’ of Siegel and Forget [10,38]: The consequence
relation |∼X of these logics holds between a set of formulas Γ and a formula A modulo a
set X of formulas, where the definition is
Γ |∼X A iff Cn
(
Γ ∪ {A})∩X = Cn(Γ )∩X
As Makinson [31] pointed out, X can be understood as a set of ‘bad’ propositions that one
is to avoid. So Γ |∼X A is true iff A can be realized together with Γ without increasing
the set of ‘bad’ proposition above those that were already true given Γ . Here we have a
set I of ‘desired’ propositions, so a statement seems ‘bad’ if it asserts that some desired
proposition be false, e.g., ¬A is true for some A ∈ I , or that at least one A1, . . . ,An ∈ I is
false, i.e., ¬(A1 ∧ · · · ∧¬An) is true. Let Iuprise = {¬∧{A1, . . . ,An} | {A1, . . . ,An} ⊆ I,1
n card(I )} be the ‘bad set’ corresponding to I . We then obtain:
Observation 3 (Relation to X-logics). For any set I ⊆LPL, X = Iuprise:
I |= PF (A/C) iff {C} |∼X A
Proof. Right-to-left. Suppose {C} |X A, so Cn(C ∧ A) ∩ Iuprise = Cn(C) ∩ Iuprise, so by
monotony of Cn there is a Buprise ∈ Cn(C ∧ A) ∩ Iuprise such that Buprise /∈ Cn(C) ∩ Iuprise. By
definition, Buprise = ¬(B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bn) for some B1, . . . ,Bn ∈ I . The first fact provides
{C∧A} 
BL ¬(B1 ∧· · ·∧Bn) and by contraposition {B1, . . . ,Bn} 
BL C → ¬A. From the
second fact we obtain {C} BL ¬(B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bn), so by contraposition {B1, . . . ,Bn} BL
¬C, so {b1, . . . ,Bn} ⊆ I ′ for some maxi-consistent I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C, and so there is some
I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
BL ¬A, so I |= OF (¬A/C) and by definition I  PF (A/C).
Left-to-right. Suppose I  PF (A/C), so there is a I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
BL ¬A.
By compactness of BL there are {B1, . . . ,Bn} ⊆ I ′ with {B1, . . . ,Bn} 
BL C → ¬A,
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that Buprise = ¬(B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bn). Hence {C ∧ A} 
BL Buprise, so Buprise ∈ Cn(C ∧ A) ∩ Iuprise, and
{C} BL Buprise, so Buprise /∈ Cn(C)∩ Iuprise. So Cn(C ∧A)∩ Iuprise = Cn(C)∩ Iuprise, and {C} |X A.
A unified treatment of both, skeptical and credulous consequence can be found in
Bochman’s ‘epistemic states’-semantics in [2–4]. Epistemic states, equivalent to the cumu-
lative models in [26], are triples E = 〈S,≺, 〉, where S is a set of objects (belief states),
≺ some asymmetric ‘preference’ relation on S, and  a labeling function that assigns each
state s ∈ S a deductively closed theory. minS′ = {s ∈ S′ | ∀t ∈ S′, t = s: t ⊀ s} is the set
of minimal states in S′ ⊆ S. 〈A〉 = {s ∈ S | ¬A /∈ (s)} is the set of belief states consistent
with A. For each A, 〈A〉 must be ≺-smooth, i.e., for any s ∈ 〈A〉, either s ∈ min〈A〉 or there
is some t ∈ min〈A〉 with t ≺ s. With BL as basic logic, Bochman’s definitions for skeptical
and credulous consequence relations |∼ and |≈ are:
A |∼E B iff ∀s ∈ min〈A〉: (s) 
BL A → B
A |≈E B iff 〈A〉 = ∅ or ∃s ∈ min〈A〉: (s) 
BL A → B
Observation 4 (Relation to Bochman’s epistemic states). Let I ⊆ LPL, and let the cor-
responding ‘epistemic state’ EI = 〈S,≺, 〉 be such that (i) S =P(I ), (ii) (s) = Cn(s),
and (iii) s ≺ t iff t  s. Then
I |= OS(A/C) iff C |∼EI A
I |= OF (A/C) iff PL ¬C and C |≈EI A
Proof. I prove first (a) I ′ ∈ min〈A〉 iff I ′ ∈ I⊥¬A, (b) EI is an epistemic state, (c) 〈A〉 = ∅
iff 
BL ¬A: For (a), by definition 〈A〉 = {I ′ ⊆ I | I ′ BL ¬A}, so 〈A〉 is the set of subsets
of I consistent with A. I ′ ∈ min〈A〉 means that for any I ′′ ∈ min〈A〉, I ′ = I ′′: I ′′ ⊀ I ′.
By definition for any I ′′ ∈ 〈A〉, I ′ = I ′′: I ′  I ′′. This means there is no I ′′ ∈ I consistent
with A such that I ′ ⊆ I ′′, which means I ′ ∈ I⊥¬A. For (b), if I ′ ⊆ I is in 〈A〉, i.e., it is
consistent with A, and I ′ /∈ I⊥¬A then by definition of I⊥¬A there is some I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬A
such that I ′ ⊂ I ′′, so there is some I ′′ ∈ min〈A〉 with I ′′ ≺ I ′. So EI is smooth, hence
it is an epistemic state. For (c), 〈A〉 = ∅ iff {I ′ ∈ P(I ) | I ′ BL ¬A} = ∅ iff ∅ 
BL ¬A
holds by monotony of BL. Putting together, we get: I |= OS(A/C) iff ∀I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪
{C} 
BL A iff ∀I ′ ∈ min〈C〉: I ′ 
BL C → A iff C |∼EI A. Likewise: I |= OF (A/C) iff∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
BL A iff ∃I ′ ∈ min〈C〉: I ′ 
BL C → A iff 〈C〉 = ∅ and [〈C〉 = ∅
or ∃I ′ ∈ min〈C〉: I ′ 
BL C → A] iff BL ¬C and C |≈EI A.
A final parallel brings us back to deontic logic, namely the multiplex preference seman-
tics of Goble in [12–14], where a multitude of preference relations enables definitions like
‘all-best’ (universally preferred) and ‘some-best’ (existentially preferred), which are then
used in definitions of deontic operators. That, in the finite case, such semantics corresponds
closely to the present account will be explicated in Section 6. Regarding meta-theory, for
a somewhat more general semantic setting the skeptical consequence relation was axiom-
atized by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [26], and the credulous consequence relation by
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missing so far and this is what I shall now turn to.
5. The dyadic deontic logic DDL{F,S}
Let the basic logic be propositional logic PL: The alphabet has proposition letters
Prop = {p1,p2, . . .}, operators ‘¬’, ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘→’, ‘↔’ and parentheses ‘(’, ‘)’. The lan-
guage LPL is defined as usual.
∧
,
∨
in front of a set of sentences means their conjunction
and disjunction, and, e.g., ∧ni=1 Ai further abbreviates ∧{Ai, . . . ,An}. Semantically, val-
uation functions v : Prop → {1,0} define the truth of sentences A ∈LPL as usual (written
v |= A), B is the set of all such valuations, and ‖A‖ is the extension {v ∈ B | v |= A} of A.
PL is a sound and complete axiomatic system, and 
PL A means that A is provable in PL.
The alphabet of the language LDDL{F,S} additionally has the operators ‘OF ’, ‘OS ’, and
the auxiliary ‘/’. DDL{F,S} is then the smallest set such that
(a) for all A,C ∈LPL, OF (A/C) and OS(A/C) ∈L {F,S}DDL ,
(b) if A,B ∈L {F,S}DDL , so are ¬A, (A∧B), (A∨B), (A → B), (A ↔ B).
Outer parentheses will be mostly omitted. We define P ∗(A/C) =def ¬O∗(¬A/C), where
* is F or S. For simplification we do not permit mixed expressions and nested deontic
operators like p1 ∧OS(p2/p1), PS(OF (p2/p2)/p1).
For DDL{F,S}-semantics, the truth of DDL{F,S}-sentences is defined with respect to a
set I ⊆LPL (Boolean operators being as usual):
I |= OF (A/C) iff ∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
PL A
I |= OS(A/C) iff ∀I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
PL A
If I |= A, A is called DDL{F,S}-satisfiable, and DDL{F,S}-valid if I |= A for all I ⊆LPL
(we write |=DDL{F,S} A).
Consider the following axiom-schemes (* is the uniform index F or S):
(CExt∗) If 
PL C → (A ↔ B) then 
DDL{F,S} O∗(A/C) ↔ O∗(B/C)
(ExtC∗) If 
PL C ↔ D then 
DDL{F,S} O∗(A/C) ↔ O∗(A/D)
(DM∗) O∗(A∧B/C) → (O∗(A/C)∧O∗(B/C))
(DCS) OS(A/C)∧OS(B/C) → OS(A∧B/C)
(DCSF ) OS(A/C)∧OF (B/C) → OF (A∧B/C)
(DNS) OS(/C) ∣∣ (DN-R∗) If PL ¬C then 
DDL{F,S} O∗(/C)
(DPF ) PF (/C) ∣∣ (DP-R∗) If PL ¬C then 
DDL{F,S} P ∗(/C)
(Cond∗) O∗(A/C ∧D) → O∗(D → A/C)
(CCMon∗) O∗(A∧D/C) → O∗(A/C ∧D)
(RMonF ) PF (D/C) → (OF (A/C) → OF (A/C ∧D))
8 One might add a third (monadic) deontic modality O2 that ‘more directly talks about the imperatives’ to
axiomatize consistent agglomeration, but I must leave the details to future study (cf. [17, Section 6] for the
resulting monadic system DL{2,F,S}).
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(RMonSSF) P S(D/C) → (OS(A/C) → OF (A/C ∧D))
The system DDL{F,S} is then the set such that (i) all LDDL{F,S} -instances of PL-tautologies
are in DDL{F,S}, (ii) all LPL-instances of the above axiom schemes are in DDL{F,S},
and (iii) DDL{F,S} is closed under modus ponens. If A ∈ DDL{F,S} we write 
DDL{F,S} A
and call A provable in DDL{F,S}. Γ ⊆ LDDL{F,S} is DDL{F,S}-inconsistent iff there are
A1, . . . ,An in Γ , n  1, with 
DDL{F,S} (A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An) → ⊥, otherwise Γ is DDL{F,S}-
consistent. A ∈LDDL{F,S} is DDL{F,S}-derivable from Γ ⊆LDDL{F,S} (written Γ 
DDL{F,S}
A) iff Γ ∪ {¬A} is DDL{F,S}-inconsistent.
Theorem 1. The following are DDL{F,S}-derivable (* is a uniform index or as indicated):
(RefS) OS(A/A)
∣∣ (Ref-R∗) If PL ¬A then 
DDL{F,S} O∗(A/A)
(RW∗) If 
PL A → B then 
DDL{F,S} O∗(A/C) → O∗(B/C)
(Pres∗) O∗(⊥/C) → (O∗(A/D) → O∗(A∧ ¬C/D))
(CMon∗) O∗(D/C) → (O∗(A/C) → O∗(A/C ∧D)) ∣∣ SSS, SFF, FSF
(Cut∗) O∗(D/C) → (O∗(A/C ∧D) → O∗(A/C)) ∣∣ SSS, SFF, FSF
(Or∗) (O∗(A/C)∧O∗(A/D)) → O∗(A/C ∨D) ∣∣ SSS, SFF, FSF
(DR∗) O∗(A/C ∨D) → (O∗(A/C)∨O∗(A/D)) ∣∣ FFF, SFS,SSF
(FH∗) P ∗(C/D) → (O∗(A/C ∨D) → O∗(A/C)) ∣∣ FFF, FSS, SSF
(FH+∗) P ∗(A → C/C ∨D) → (O∗(A/C ∨D) → O∗(A/C)) ∣∣ FFF, FSS, SSF
(Trans∗) P ∗(A/A∨B)∧ P ∗(B/B ∨C) → P ∗(A/A∨C) ∣∣ FFF, FSS, SFS
(P -LoopF ) PF (A2/A1)∧ · · · ∧ PF (An/An−1)∧ PF (A1/An) → PF (An/A1)
(LoopS) OS(A2/A1)∧ · · · ∧OS(An/An−1)∧OS(A1/An) → OS(An/A1)
Proof. All easy and left to the reader.
Regarding axioms and theorems, (CExt∗) is a contextual extensionality rule for conse-
quents, and (ExtC∗) an extensionality rule for antecedents. (DM∗) and (DC∗) are dyadic
versions of their monadic analogues. The OS -axioms are like those of Kraus, Lehmann
and Magidor [26], but (CondS ) and (CCMonS ) equivalently replace (OrS ) and (CMonS ),
and (DP-RS ) is added. The OF -axioms are those of Bochman [2], where his (PresF ) is
strengthened to (DPF ). Instead of (CondF ), (CCMonF ) and (RMonF ), Goble [14] more
elegantly employs (TransF ) and (DRF ), which is equivalent given (DP-RF ). The ‘mixed
schemes’ are again Bochman’s. Instead of (DCSF), (RMonFSS), and (RMonSSF), Goble has
(DKSF) OS(A → B/C) → (OF (A/C) → OF (B/C))
(TransFSS) and (TransSFS), which is again equivalent. The names are from the study of non-
monotonic logics, namely reflexivity, right weakening, preservation, (conjunctive) cautious
monotony, conditionalization and disjunctive reasoning. (Ref∗) is Hansson’s [18, Theo-
rem 2], (CCMon∗) Rescher’s [36, Theorem 4.4], (Or∗) is the right-to-left version of von
Wright’s (B3) in [46], and (DR∗) Hansson’s Theorem 13. Føllesdal and Hilpinen [9] intro-
duced the strong version (FH∗) of (RMon∗) (their Theorem 77). (FH+∗) is even stronger:
its displayed versions could replace (CCMon∗) and (RMon∗∗), ∗∗=F,FSS,SSF. (Trans∗)
is transitivity of weak preference given by A B =def P ∗(A/A ∨ B) (Lewis [28, p. 54]).
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pleteness proof of Hansson’s DSDL3, and its O-form was rediscovered by Kraus, Lehmann
and Magidor [26] who put it to the same use. Note that (CCMon∗) is (P -Cond∗), and (Cut∗)
is (P -RMon∗), where the deontic operators are swapped in the P -versions.
Theorem 2. DDL{F,S} is sound.
Proof. The validity of (DM∗), (DCS ), (DCSF), (CExt∗), and (ExtC∗) is immediate. (DNS ),
(DPF ) are valid since any subset of LPL derives , and any maximally consistent subset
is consistent. If PL ¬C then at least ∅ is in I⊥¬C, hence I⊥¬C = ∅ and then both
(DN-RF ) and (DP-RS ) hold likewise.
(CondF ) Assume OF (A/C ∧ D), so there is an I ′ ∈ I⊥¬(C ∧ D) such that I ′ ∪ {C ∧
D} 
PL A and I ′ ∪ {C} 
PL D → A. Since I ′ PL ¬(C ∧ D), also I ′ PL ¬C,
so by maximality there is an I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬C such that I ′ ⊆ I ′′, so there is an I ′′ ∈
I⊥¬C: I ′′ ∪ {C} 
PL D → A, so OF (D → A/C).
(CondS) Assume OS(A/C ∧ D). So for all I ′ ∈ I⊥¬(C ∧ D) : I ′ ∪ {C ∧ D} 
PL A.
If there is an I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′′ ∪ {C} PL D → A then I ′′ ∪ {C} PL ¬D and
I ′′ PL ¬(C ∧ D). By maximality ∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬(C ∧ D): I ′′ ⊆ I ′. Since I ′ PL
¬(C ∧ D), I ′ PL ¬C, so there is an I ′′′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ⊆ I ′′′. Then I ′′ ⊆ I ′′′ and
by maximality of I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬C, I ′′ = I ′′′ and hence I ′′ = I ′. So I ′′ is in I⊥¬(C ∧
D) and I ′′ ∪ {C ∧ D} PL A, but this violates the assumption. So for all I ′′ ∈
I⊥¬C: I ′′ ∪ {C} 
PL D → A, and OS(D → A/C).
(CCMonF ) Assume OF (A ∧ D/C), so ∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
PL A ∧ D. Then I ′ ∪
{C} PL ¬D, for otherwise I ′ 
PL ¬C which is excluded by the definition of
I⊥¬C. So I ′ PL ¬(C ∧ D), by maximality ∃I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬(C ∧ D): I ′ ⊆ I ′′ and
I ′′ ∪ {C} 
PL A, I ′′ ∪ {C ∧D} 
PL A. Hence OF (A/C ∧D).
(CCMonS) Assume OS(A ∧ D/C), so for all I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
PL A ∧ D, and so
I ′ ∪ {C} PL ¬D, for otherwise I ′ 
PL ¬C contrary to the definition of I⊥¬C,
and so for all I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ PL ¬(C ∧ D). Suppose I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬(C ∧ D), so
I ′′ PL ¬(C ∧D) and I ′′ PL ¬C. By maximality ∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C such that I ′′ ⊆ I ′.
In turn I ′ PL ¬(C∧D) as just proved, so ∃I ′′′ ∈ I⊥¬(C∧D) such that I ′ ⊆ I ′′′.
But then I ′′ = I ′′′ by maximality of I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬(C ∧ D), so I ′′ = I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C and
I ′′ ∪ {C} 
PL A as assumed. So I ′′ ∪ {C ∧ D} 
PL A for any I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬(C ∧ D).
So OS(A/C ∧D) is true.
(RMonF ) Assume OF (A/C), so ∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
PL A. If PF (D/C) then
∀I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} PL ¬D. So I ′ PL ¬(C ∧ D). So by maximality ∃I ′′ ∈
I⊥¬(C ∧D): I ′ ⊆ I ′′, so I ′′ ∪ {C} 
PL A, by monotony I ′′ ∪ {C ∧D} 
PL A, so
OF (A/C ∧D) is true.
(RMonFSS) Assume OS(A/C), so ∀I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
PL A, and PF (D/C), so
∀I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪{C} PL ¬D, so I ′ PL ¬(C∧D). Suppose I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬(C∧D),
so also I ′′ PL ¬C and by maximality ∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C : I ′′ ⊆ I ′. We have I ′ ∪
{C} 
PL A, so ∃B1, . . . ,Bn ∈ I ′: {B1, . . . ,Bn} ∪ {C} 
PL A by PL-compactness.
If I ′′ ∪ {C} PL A then {B1, . . . ,Bn}  I ′′, by maximality I ′′ ∪ {B1, . . . ,Bn} 
PL
¬(C ∧D), but I ′′ ∪ {B1, . . . ,Bn} ⊆ I ′, so I ′ ∪ {C} 
PL ¬(C ∧D) contrary to the
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PL A, I ′′ ∪ {C ∧D} 
PL A for any I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬(C ∧D).
So OS(A/C ∧D) is true.
(RMonSSF ) Assume OS(A/C), so ∀I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} 
PL A, and PS(D/C), so
∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬C: I ′ ∪ {C} PL ¬D. So I ′ PL ¬(C ∧ D). So by maximality
∃I ′′ ∈ I⊥¬(C ∧ D): I ′ ⊆ I ′′, so I ′′ ∪ {C} 
PL A, so I ′′ ∪ {C ∧ D} 
PL A, so
OF (A/C ∧D) is true.
Theorem 3. DDL{F,S}-semantics are not compact.
Proof. In [17], I provided a counterexample to the compactness of semantics that only
employ the monadic deontic operator OF . Since OFA can be defined as OF (A/), this
also refutes the compactness of DDL{F,S} and of the subsystem containing only the dyadic
operator OF . The following counterexample is expressed in terms of the dyadic opera-
tors OS only, which also refutes the compactness of the subsystem containing only this
operator: let
Γ = {OS(p2/)}
∪ {PS(¬p2/p1)}∪ ∞⋃
i=3
{
OS(pi/p1)
}
∪ {PS(¬p2/¬p1)}∪ ∞⋃
i=3
{
OS(pi/¬p1)
}
∪ {PS(¬p2/p1 ↔ p2)}∪ ∞⋃
i=3
{
OS(pi/p1 ↔ p2)
}
∪ {PS(¬p2/p1 ↔ ¬p2)}∪ ∞⋃
i=3
{
OS(pi/p1 ↔ ¬p2)
}
Γ is finitely DDL{F,S}-satisfiable: let n be the greatest index of any proposition letter oc-
curring in some finite Γf ⊆ Γ . Then
If =
{
pn+1 ∧ (p1 → ¬p2),¬pn+1 ∧ (¬p1 → ¬p2),p2,p3, . . . , pn
}
satisfies Γf . For easy verification, I list the relevant sets of maximal subsets:
If ⊥¬ =
{ {pn+1 ∧ (p1 → ¬p2),p2,p3, . . . , pn)},
{¬pn+1 ∧ (¬p1 → ¬p2),p2,p3, . . . , pn)}
}
If ⊥¬p1
If − ⊥¬(p1 ↔ p2) =
{ {pn+1 ∧ (p1 → ¬p2),p3, . . . , pn)},
{¬pn+1 ∧ (¬p1 → ¬p2),p2,p3, . . . , pn)}
}
If ⊥p1
If ⊥¬(p1 ↔ ¬p2) =
{ { pn+1 ∧ (p1 → ¬p2),p2,p3, . . . , pn)},
{ ¬pn+1 ∧ (¬p1 → ¬p2),p3, . . . , pn)}
}
However, Γ is not DDL{F,S}-satisfiable: suppose I ⊆ LPL satisfies Γ , and let A ∈
{p1,¬p1,p1 ↔ p2,p1 ↔ ¬p2}. Observe that
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PL p1 ∧ pi , I2 
PL ¬p1 ∧ pi , i  2.
Proof. From OS(p2/),P S(¬p2/¬p1) ∈ Γ and the validity of (RMonFSS), fol-
lows OF (p1/), i.e., there is an I1 ∈ I⊥¬: I1 
PL p1. Likewise from OS(p2/)
and PS(¬p2/p1) ∈ Γ , it follows that there is an I2 ∈ I⊥¬: I2 
PL ¬p1. To
satisfy OS(p2/) it is necessary that for all I ′ ∈ I⊥¬: I ′ 
PL p2, and from
OS(pi/p1),OS(pi/¬p1) ∈ Γ , and the validity of (OrS ), it is obtained that for all
I ′ ∈ I⊥¬: I ′ 
PL pi , i  3.
(ii) For each A, there is an IA ∈ I⊥¬A : IA ∪ {A} 
PL ¬p2.
Proof. Let A ∈ {p1,p1 ↔ p2}. Then by observation (i) I1 ∈ I⊥¬A. Since I1 
PL
p2, to satisfy PS(¬p2/A) ∈ Γ there is an IA ∈ I⊥¬A such that IA ∪ I1 
PL ¬A.
So IA ∪ {A} 
PL ¬(p1 ∧ p2 ∧ · · · ∧ pn) for some n. If n  3, then IA ∪ {A} 
PL
¬(p1 ∧ p2 ∧ · · · ∧ pn−1), since IA ∪ {A} 
PL pn is necessary for OS(pn/A) ∈ Γ .
So IA ∪ {A} 
PL ¬(p1 ∧ p2), so IA ∪ {A} 
PL ¬p2. Likewise, the proof for A ∈
{¬p1,p1 ↔ ¬p2} is obtained from I2 ∈ I⊥¬A.
(iii) If A ∈ {p1,p1 ↔ ¬p2} then IA ∪ {p1,¬p2,p3,p4, . . .} PL ⊥.
If A ∈ {¬p1,p1 ↔ p2} then IA ∪ {¬p1,¬p2,p3,p4, . . .} PL ⊥.
Proof. Suppose A ∈ {p1,p1 ↔ ¬p2} and IA ∪ {p1,¬p2,p3,p4, . . .} 
PL ⊥. Then
IA ∪ {A,¬p2,p3,p4, . . .} 
PL ⊥. So IA ∪ {A} 
PL ¬(¬p2 ∧ p3 ∧ p4 ∧ · · · ∧ pn)
for some n. But also IA ∪ {A} 
PL ¬p2 ∧ p3 ∧ p4 ∧ · · · ∧ pn by observation (ii)
and from the fact that I satisfies OS(pi/A) ∈ Γ , 3  i  n. So IA 
PL ¬A, but
this contradicts IA ∈ I⊥¬A. The proof for A ∈ {¬p1,p1 ↔ p2} and the set IA ∪
{¬p1,¬p2,p3,p4, . . .} is done likewise.
It follows that Ip1 ∪ I(p1↔¬p2) PL ⊥ and I¬p1 ∪ I(p1↔p2) PL ⊥. This is most easily
seen by appealing to PL-semantics: some v ∈ B satisfies {p1,¬p2,p3,p4, . . .} and by (iii)
all elements of Ip1 as well as all of I(p1↔¬p2), so their union is satisfiable and therefore
consistent (likewise for {¬p1,¬p2,p3,p4, . . .} and I¬p1 ∪ I(p1↔p2)). From (ii) it follows
that
Ip1 ∪ I(p1↔¬p2) 
PL (p1 → ¬p2)∧
(
(p1 ↔ ¬p2) → ¬p2
)
I¬p1 ∪ I(p1↔p2) 
PL (¬p1 → ¬p2)∧
(
(p1 ↔ p2) → ¬p2
)
But the conclusions are tautologically equivalent to ¬p2, so there are consistent subsets of
I that derive ¬p2, and I  OS(p2/), although OS(p2/) ∈ Γ .
Theorem 4. DDL{F,S} is weakly complete.
Proof. The proof follows the completeness proof of Spohn [39] for B. Hansson’s [18]
preference-based dyadic deontic logic DSDL3. Since parts of this proof will be reused in
the next section for logics that might not include unrestricted (DN∗) or (DP∗), I will avoid
their use up to the last step of this proof.
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DDL{F,S} A for any A ∈LPL.
We assume DDL{F,S} A so ¬A is DDL{F,S}-consistent. We build a disjunctive normal
form of ¬A and obtain a disjunction of conjunctions, where each conjunct is O∗(B/C)
or ¬O∗(B/C). One disjunct must be DDL{F,S}-consistent. Let δ be that disjunct. Let the
δ-restricted language L δPL be the PL-sentences that contain only proposition letters occur-
ring in δ. Let r(L δPL) be 22
n
mutually non-equivalent representatives of L δPL, where n is
the number of proposition letters in δ. By writing PL-sentences (including  and ⊥), we
now mean their unique representatives in r(L δPL). We construct a set ∆ as follows:
(a) Any conjunct of δ is in ∆.
(b) For all B,C ∈ r(L δPL):
– either PF (B/C) or OF (¬B/C) ∈ ∆, and
– either PS(B/C) or OS(¬B/C) ∈ ∆.
(c) ∆ is DDL{F,S}-consistent.
It then suffices to find a set I ⊆LPL that makes true all B ∈ ∆.
B. Identifying the deontic bases. We identify syntactically what Hansson called the de-
ontic basis in an extension ‖C‖ (Spohn [39] writes C˜). Monadic deontic logic has just one
basis, dyadic deontic logic usually has one basis for any C, and here there may be several
bases, which expresses some conflict or predicament in case C.
Definition 1. For any C = ⊥, C ∈ r(L δPL), let
– OSC =
∧{A ∈ r(L δPL) | OS(A/C) ∈ ∆},
– OFC = min{A ∈ r(L δPL) | OF (A/C) ∈ ∆}
where minΓ = {A ∈ Γ | ∀B ∈ Γ , if 
PL B → A then 
PL B ↔ A}, Γ ⊆LPL.
From (DCS ), (RW∗), and DDL{F,S}-consistency of ∆ we obtain, for any C = ⊥:
(B1) OS(A/C) ∈ ∆ iff 
PL OSC → A,
(B2) OF (A/C) ∈ ∆ iff ∃O ∈ OFC : 
PL O→ A.
C. Identifying the relevant class of domains. We identify the most general circumstances
CA where A is PF -permitted. To the same effect, Spohn employs equivalence classes [A]≈
defined using (P -LoopF ): A ≈ B iff B is in some {B1, . . . ,Bn} ⊆ r(L δPL) with PF (B1/A),
PF (B2/B1), . . . , PF (Bn/Bn−1), PF (A/Bn) ∈ ∆. The set of all such classes is then {[C]≈ |
C ∈ C}.
Definition 2. For all A ∈ r(L δPL), let
CA = max
{
C ∈ r(L δPL) | PF (A/C) ∈ ∆
}
C =
⋃
A∈r(L δPL)
CA
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PL A → B , then 
PL B ↔ A}.
(C1) If PF (A/D) ∈ ∆, then there is a C ∈ CA such that 
PL D → C.
Proof. Immediate from definition of CA and finitude of r(L δPL).
(C2) For all C ∈ C: CC = {C}.
Proof. By definition C ∈ CA for some A ∈ r(L δPL), so by definition PF (A/C) ∈ ∆,
and PF (C/C) due to (CExtF ). Suppose C′ ∈ CC : then by definition PF (C/C′) ∈ ∆.
With (FHF ) we get PF (A/C ∨ C′),P F (C/C ∨ C′) ∈ ∆, so C = (C ∨ C′) = C′ follows
from maximality of C,C′.
(C3) For all C ∈ C, if PF (C/D) ∈ ∆, then 
PL D → C.
Proof. By definition C ∈ CA for some A ∈ r(L δPL), so by definition PF (A/C) ∈ ∆.
If PF (C/D) ∈ ∆, then we get PF (A/C ∨ D) ∈ ∆ with (FHF ). So C = (C ∨ D) by
maximality, hence 
PL D → C.
(C4) For all A = ⊥: CA = {CA} for some CA ∈ CA and 
PL A → CA.
Proof. If A = ⊥ then PF (A/A) ∈ ∆ due to (DP-RF ) and (CExtF ), so there is some
C ∈ CA such that 
PL A → C by (C1). Assume C′ ∈ CA: By definition PF (A/C),
PF (A/C′) ∈ ∆, so we get PF (C/C′) ∈ ∆ with (RWF ), and PF (A/C ∨ C′) ∈ ∆ with
(FHF ), so C = (C ∨ C′) = C′ by maximality. So C is the desired CA.
(C5) For all A = ⊥: 
PL OSA ↔ (A∧OSCA).
Proof. 
PL A → CA due to (C4), and by (B2) OS(OSA/A) ∈ ∆, so with (CondS ) we
obtain OS(A →OSA/CA) ∈ ∆ and thus the right-to-left direction 
PL (A ∧OSCA) →
OSA. For the opposite, 
PL OSA → A follows from (CExtS ), by definitions and (C4)
PF (A/CA), OS(OSCA/CA) ∈ ∆, so we get OS(OSCA/A) ∈ ∆ with (RMonFSS). So

PL OSA → (A∧OSCA).
(C6) For all A = ⊥, OA ∈ OFA: ∃OCA ∈ OFCA : 
PL OA ↔ (A∧OCA).
Proof. Let OA ∈ OFA , so OF (OA/A) ∈ ∆. 
PL A → CA and (CondF ) derive
OF (A →OA/CA) ∈ ∆, so ∃OCA ∈ OFCA with 
PL (A∧OCA) →OA. If PF (¬OCA/
A) ∈ ∆, then from OF (OCA/CA) ∈ ∆ and (RMonF ) we get OF (¬A/CA) ∈ ∆, but
by definition PF (A/CA) ∈ ∆. So OF (OCA/A) ∈ ∆, and OF (A ∧OCA/A) ∈ ∆ by
(CExt). Since 
PL (A∧OCA) →OA we obtain 
PL OA ↔ (A∧OCA) by minimality
of OA.
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Proof. {C →OC}∪ {D}  ⊥. If OF (¬C/D) ∈ ∆, then the conclusion is trivial. Oth-
erwise PF (C/D) ∈ ∆, so 
PL D → C by (C3). For r.a.a. suppose PF (¬OC/D) ∈ ∆.
With OF (OC/C) ∈ ∆ we obtain OF (OC ∧¬D/C) ∈ ∆ by (FH+F ), and 
PL OC →
¬D by minimality of OC . But then 
PL D → (C ∧¬OC), which refutes the assump-
tion. Hence OF (OC/D) ∈ ∆ and OF (C →OC/D) ∈ ∆ by use of (CExtF ).
D. Identifying the multiple system of spheres. If this were ‘ordinary’ dyadic deontic logic
with agglomeration and so just one basis OC for any C, we would be almost done: like
Spohn [39] orders his equivalence classes [C]≈ by a relation before, C could be ordered
into 〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉 with C1 = , and Ci+1 = Ci ∧¬OCi until this equals ⊥. 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉 with
Si = (Ci ∧ ¬Ci+1), 1 i < n, is then the ‘system of spheres’. Here this method fails since
no C ∈ C is guaranteed to have a single basis. But as it turns out, C has the structure of a
‘multiple’ system of spheres that is similarly identified.
(D1) {} ⊆ C.
Proof. PF (/) ∈ ∆ by (DP-RF ), and 
PL C →  for any PF (/C) ∈ ∆, so
 ∈ C,  ∈ C.
(D2) For all C ∈ C, O ∈ OFC : If C ∧ ¬O = ⊥, then C ∧ ¬O ∈ C.
Proof. If C ∧ ¬O = ⊥ then PF (/C ∧ ¬O) ∈ ∆ by (DP-RF ), CC∧¬O ∈ CF . We
prove CC∧¬O = C ∧ ¬O: 
PL (C ∧ ¬O) → CC∧¬O is immediate from (CExtF )
and (C1). If PL CC∧¬O → (C ∧ ¬O) then {C → O} PL ¬CC∧¬O , so OF (C →
O/CC∧¬O) ∈ ∆ follows from (C7). PF (C ∧ ¬O/CC∧¬O) ∈ ∆ by definition, so ∆ is
DDL{F,S}-inconsistent, but we assumed otherwise.
(D3) For all C ∈ C: If 
PL C → D, C = D, then ∃O ∈ OFD: 
PL C → (D ∧ ¬O).
Proof. Either PF (C/D) ∈ ∆, so 
PL D → C, C = D (C3). Or OF (¬C/D) ∈ ∆, so

PL O→ ¬C for some O ∈ OFD and 
PL C → (D ∧ ¬O).
(D4) For all D ∈ r(L δPL), O ∈ OFD ∪ {OSD}: If D = ⊥, then D = (D ∧ ¬O).
Proof. If D = (D∧¬O), then 
PL D → ¬O. But also 
PL O→ D due to (CExt∗),
so O = ⊥ and O∗(⊥/D) ∈ ∆ by (B1-2). So D = ⊥ by (DP-R∗).
(D5) Let D be such that (i)  ∈ D, and (ii) if D ∈ D, O ∈ OFD and (D ∧ ¬O) = ⊥, then
(D ∧ ¬O) ∈ D. Then D = C\{⊥}.
Proof. D ⊆ C is immediate from (D1), (D2). As for C ⊆ D, for each C ∈ C, C = ⊥,
there is some D ∈ D such that (a) 
PL C → D, and (b) for no O ∈ OF :
PL C →D
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of r(L δPL). So C = D by (D3).
E. Canonical construction and coincidence lemma.
Definition 3 (Canonical construction). For all C ∈ C ∪ {⊥}, D ∈ r(L δPL)
– F-Succ(D) = {D ∧ ¬O |O ∈ OFD},
– F-Chain(C) be the set of sequences 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉, 1  n, where D1 = , Di+1 ∈
F-Succ(Di), Di = Di+1 for any 1 i < n, and Dn = C,
– S-Chain(C,D) be the set of sequences 〈D1, . . . ,Dk,Dk+1, . . . ,Dn〉, 1 k < n, where
〈D1, . . . ,Dk〉 ∈ F-Chain(C), Di+1 = Di ∧ ¬OSDi , Di = Di+1 for any k  i < n, and
Dn = D.
For any C ∈ C\{⊥}, C′ ∈ F-Succ(C), let
– π :C∪{⊥} → [Prop\L δPL] be a function that associates a unique proposition letter not
occurring in δ with each element of C ∪ {⊥},
– φ(C,C′) = π(C′)∧∧{¬π(C′′) | C′′ ∈ F-Succ(C),C′ = C′′},
– σ(C) =∧{¬π(C′) | C′ ∈ F-Succ(C)}.
For any C ∈ C ∪ {⊥} \ {}, 〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉 ∈ F-Chain(C), let
– iF [〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉] = ¬C ∧∧n−1i=1 φ(Ci ,Ci+1).
For any C ∈ C, 〈D1, . . . ,Dk,Dk+1, . . . ,Dn〉 ∈ S-Chain(C,D), Dk = C, let
– iS[〈D1, . . . ,Dk,Dk+1, . . . ,Dn〉] = ¬D ∧
{
σ(C)∧∧k−1i=1 φ(Ci ,Ci+1) if C = ,
σ (C) otherwise.
Let IF be the set of all such iF [〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉], and likewise IS be the set of all such
iS[〈D1, . . . ,Dk,Dk+1, . . . ,Dn〉]. Then finally I = IF ∪ IS .
The definition provides the construction of the canonical set I to make all of ∆ true.
F-Succ(C) is the set of immediate ‘contrary-to-duty’ successors C′ of C, i.e., ∃O ∈ OFC withC′ = C ∧ ¬O. (D2) showed each C ∈ C to be such a successor of (a successor of . . .) ,
and F-Chain(C) is the set of all such chains beginning with  and ending with C. φ is used
to make any two iF [ch(C′)], iF [ch(C′′)], C′ = C′′ being successors of (successors of. . .)
C, inconsistent with each other and with any iS[ch(C,D)] via σ . Since C is finite, so is
the number of proposition letters introduced by π , IF , IS and I . Regarding the sequences
used to construct I , I use ch(C) for 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 ∈ F-Chain(C) with C ∈ C ∪ {⊥} \ {},
ch(C,D) for 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 ∈ S-Chain(C,D) with C ∈ C, D ∈ r(L δPL), and ch, ch′, etc. for
any sequence for which either holds. We obtain:
(E1) For all ch = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉, 
PL Di+1 → Di and PL Di → Di+1, 1 i < n.
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(E3) If {iS[ch(C,D)], iS [ch(C′,D′)]} PL ⊥, then C = C′ and ch(C,D) is a segment of
ch(C′,D′) or vice versa.
(E4) If {iF [ch(C)], iS [ch(C′,D)]} PL ⊥, then ch(C) = 〈C1, . . . ,Ci〉 is a segment of
ch(C′,D) = 〈D1, . . . ,Dk,Dk+1, . . . ,Dn〉, where Dk = C′ and 1 i  k < n.
(E5) No iF [ch(C)] or iS[ch(C,D)] ∈ I is a contradiction.
Proof. (E1) is immediate from (D4). (E2–4) are immediate from the definitions of φ and
σ . For (E5), first note that each i ∈ I consists of a r(L δPL)-conjunct and a [LPL\L δPL]-
conjunct. Since no proposition letter occurring in one occurs in the other, if i is a con-
tradiction, then so must be one of its conjuncts. Regarding the r(L δPL)-conjunct, for any
iF [ch(C)] it is ¬C which must be consistent since C =  is excluded. For any iS[ch(C,D)]
the r(L δPL)-conjunct is ¬D, and ch(C,D) = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 with D1 = , Dn = D and
n = 1, so by (E1) D =  is excluded. For the [LPL\L δPL]-conjunct of any iF [ch(C)],
ch(C) = 〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉 ∈ F-Chain(C), it is ∧n−1i=1 φ(Ci ,Ci+1), a conjunction of conjunctions
of non-negated and negated proposition letters, which cannot be a contradiction:
– No conjunct φ(Ci ,Ci+1), 1 i < n, is a contradiction: For any C′ = C′′ ∈ C, π(C′) =
π(C′′), and no π(C′) occurs negated and non-negated in φ(Ci ,Ci+1).
– If π(C′) occurs non-negated in φ(Ci ,Ci+1) and negated in φ(Cj ,Cj+1), i < j ,
then C′ = Ci+1 and C′ ∈ F-Succ(Cj ). So there is a ch(C′) ∈ F-Chain(C′), ch(C′) =
〈C1, . . . ,Ci ,C′, . . . ,Cj ,C′〉, which violates (E1).
– If π(C′) occurs negated in φ(Ci ,Ci+1) and non-negated in φ(Cj ,Cj+1), i < j , then
C′ ∈ F-Succ(Ci ) and C′ = Cj+1. 
PL Cj+1 → Ci+1, so 
PL C′ → Ci+1. So there are
O1,O2 ∈ OFCi with C′ = Ci ∧ ¬O1, Ci+1 = Ci ∧ ¬O2, and 
PL (Ci ∧ ¬O1) → (Ci ∧
¬O2). Then 
PL O2 → (Ci →O1), and with (CExtF ) 
PL O2 →O1. By minimality
O2 =O1 and C′ = Ci+1, but φ(Ci ,Ci+1) left π(Ci+1) non-negated.
For the [LPL\L δPL]-conjunct of iS[ch(C,D)], the case that π(C′) occurs non-negated in
φ(Ci ,Ci+1) and negated in σ(C) is done like the second case above.
For any B ∈ r(L δPL), I ′ ∈ I⊥¬B , I ′ = ∅:
(E6) there is some designated ix ∈ I ′, ix = iF [ch] or ix = iS[ch], such that for all iF [ch′],
iS[ch′] in I ′, ch is a segment of ch′,
(E7) the r(L δPL)-conjunct of ix PL-derives the r(L δPL)-conjunct of any i ∈ I ′,
(E8) ix is iF [ch] or iS[ch] with ch = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 such that 
PL B → Dn−1.
Proof. (E6) is immediate from (E2-4) and finiteness of I ′. For (E7), the r(L δPL)-conjunct
of i is ¬Dn, where Dn is the last member of some ch = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 such that i = iF [ch]
or i = iS[ch]. By (E6) the r(L δPL)-conjunct of ix is ¬Dk for some 1  k  n, and by
(E1) 
PL ¬Dk → ¬Dn. For (E8), note that Dn−1 exists as ch = 〈〉 is excluded by the
construction. If Dn−1 = , then 
PL B → Dn−1 is trivial. Otherwise there must be some
ch′ = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn−1〉 such that i∗(ch′) ∈ I , * being F or S. By (E6), i∗(ch′) cannot be in
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and hence that of any other i′ ∈ I ′ due to (E7), while its [LPL\L δPL]-conjunct is derived
by that of ix. So it must be that {¬Dn−1} ∪ {B} 
PL ⊥, and 
PL B → Dn−1.
Lemma 1 (Coincidence lemma). For all A,B ∈ r(L δPL):
I |= OF (A/B) iff OF (A/B) ∈ ∆
I |= OS(A/B) iff OF (A/B) ∈ ∆
Proof. Coincidence for OF .
Right-to-left. Assume OF (A/B) ∈ ∆, so someOB ∈ OFB derives A. By (C6) 
PL ((CB →
OCB ) ∧ B) ↔ OB for some CB ∈ C, OCB ∈ OFCB . By (D2), CB ∧ ¬OCB ∈ C ∪
{⊥}, so iF [ch] ∈ I for some ch ∈ F-Chain(CB ∧ ¬OCB ). If {iF [ch]} PL-derives¬B , only its r(L δPL)-conjunct CB →OCB can be relevant, since the [LPL\L δPL]-
conjunct is consistent (E5) and has no proposition letter in common with ¬B .
If {CB → OCB ,B} 
PL ⊥, then OB = ⊥ which contradicts PF (/B) ∈ ∆ by
(DPF ) and DDL{F,S}-consistency of ∆. So {iF [ch]} PL ¬B , so for some I ′ ∈
I⊥¬B : I ′ ∪ {B} 
PL CB →OCB , hence I ′ ∪ {B} 
PL A.
Left-to-right. Assume PF (A/B) ∈ ∆ and for r.a.a. suppose ∃I ′ ∈ I⊥¬B: I ′ ∪ {B} 
PL
¬A. Suppose I ′ = ∅, so let ix be the designated member of I ′ and ¬D its
r(L δPL)-conjunct. Then {¬D} ∪ {B} 
PL ¬A as the r(L δPL)-conjuncts of any
i ∈ I are PL-derived by ¬D (E7), and the [LPL\L δPL]-conjuncts are not rel-
evant for a derivation of ¬A ∈ r(L δPL). ix is iF [ch] or iS[ch] for some ch =〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 with ¬D = ¬Dn = (Dn−1 → O), O ∈ OFDn−1 ∪ {OSDn−1}. So
{O} 
PL B → ¬A, so OF (B → ¬A/Dn−1) ∈ ∆ or OS(B → ¬A/Dn−1) ∈ ∆ by
(B1), (B2). From PF (A/B) ∈ ∆ we get PF (¬(B → ¬A)/B) ∈ ∆ with (CExtF ).
By (E8) 
PL B → Dn−1, so with (FH+F ) or (FH+SSF ) we obtain OF ((B →
¬A) ∧ ¬B/Dn−1) ∈ ∆ or OS((B → ¬A) ∧ ¬B/Dn−1) ∈ ∆ respectively. But
then 
 O → ¬B follows from minimality of O. So {B} 
PL Dn−1 ∧ ¬O, i.e.,
{B} 
PL D, and since {ix} 
PL ¬D we get ix /∈ I ′. So by (E6) I ′ = ∅. Then
{B} 
PL ¬A. With PF (A/B) ∈ ∆ and (CExtF ) we get PF (⊥/B), so by (DN-RF )
B = ⊥ and I⊥¬B = ∅, completing the r.a.a.
Coincidence for OS .
Right-to-left. Assume OS(A/B) ∈ ∆ and for r.a.a. suppose that there is some I ′ ∈
I⊥¬B: I ′ ∪ {B} PL A. Assume I ′ = ∅, so let ix be the designated member of I ′,
and ¬D its r(L δPL)-conjunct. ix is iF [ch] or iS[ch] for some ch = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉
with ¬D = ¬Dn = (Dn−1 → O). Either O ∈ OFDn−1 , then 
PL O → OSDn−1
follows from (DCSF), or trivially if O = OSDn−1 . By (E8) 
PL B → Dn−1, so
by (CondS ) 
PL OSDn−1 → (B → OSB), and also I ′ ∪ {B} 
PL O. Chaining the
results, we get I ′ ∪ {B} 
PL OSB , and I ′ ∪ {B} 
PL A by definition of OSB ,
contrary to what was assumed. So I ′ = ∅. For any B ∈ r(L δ ), B = ⊥, wePL
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then {iS[ch(CB, (CB ∧ ¬OSCB ))]} ∪ {B} 
PL ⊥, and {CB → OSCB } ∪ {B} 
PL ⊥
since only the r(L δPL)-conjunct is relevant. By (C4) we have 
PL B → CB , so{B ∧ OSCB } 
PL ⊥, and by (C5) OSB = ⊥. From (DP-RS ) we get B = ⊥, so
I⊥¬B = ∅, which completes the r.a.a.
Left-to-right. Assume OS(A/B) /∈ ∆. B = ⊥ due to (DNS ) and (CExtS ), so iS[ch(CB,
(CB ∧ ¬OSCB ))] ∈ I ′ for some I ′ ∈ I⊥¬B (otherwise again B = ⊥). If
iF [ch(C′)] ∈ I ′, then ch(C′) is a segment of ch(CB, (CB ∧ ¬OSCB )) by (E4), so

PL ¬C′ → ¬CB and as 
PL B → CB also 
PL ¬C′ → ¬B . So iF [ch(C′)] /∈ I ′
and I ′ ∩ IF = ∅. If iS[ch(C′,D′)] ∈ I ′, then ch(CB, (CB ∧ ¬OSCB )) is a seg-
ment of ch(C′,D′) by (E3), so its r(L δPL)-conjunct ¬D′ is derived by that
of iS[ch(CB, (CB ∧ ¬OSCB ))]. The [LPL\L δPL]-conjuncts are not relevant, so if
I ′ ∪ B 
PL A, then {CB →OSCB } ∪ {B} 
PL A. Since 
PL B → CB , by (C4) then
{B∧OSCB } 
PL A, and by (C5) 
PL OSB → A, so OS(A/B) ∈ ∆ by (B1), contrary
to the assumption. So I ′ ∪ B PL A, so not for all I ′ ∈ I⊥¬B: I ′ ∪ {B} 
PL A,
so I |= OS(A/B) is false.
6. A link to multiplex preference semantics
In the preceding section, the completeness theorem was proved by identifying a multiple
system of spheres. This multiple system of spheres can just as well be used to construct a
multitude of preference relations, which—as originated with Goble [13,14]—can then in
turn be used to define the deontic operators: let P be a non-empty set of preference relations
P ⊆ B × B such that each P is transitive, connected, and satisfies the ‘limit assumption’:
(LA) If ‖A‖ = ∅ then bestP (‖A‖) = ∅
where bestP (‖A‖) = {v ∈ ‖A‖ | ∀v′ ∈ ‖A‖: vPv′}. For Hansson-type operators, let
L
DDL{F+,S} be like LDDL{F,S} except that O
F+ replaces OF , and let the truth definitions
for the deontic operators read:
P |= OF+(A/C) iff ∃P ∈ P: bestP (‖C‖) ⊆ ‖A‖
P |= OS(A/C) iff ∀P ∈ P: bestP (‖C‖) ⊆ ‖A‖
Likewise, for Lewis-type operators, let L
DDL{F,S−} be like LDDL{F,S} except that O
S− re-
places OS , and the truth definitions now read:
P |= OF (A/C) iff ∃P ∈ P: ∃v ∈ ‖C ∧A‖: ∀v′ ∈ ‖C ∧ ¬A‖: not v′Pv
P |= OS−(A/C) iff ∀P ∈ P: ∃v ∈ ‖C ∧A‖: ∀v′ ∈ ‖C ∧ ¬A‖: not v′Pv
The axiomatic system DDL{F+,S} is like DDL{F,S} except that (DNF ) replaces (DN-RF )and
(DP-RF ) replaces (DPF ). Similarly, DDL{F,S−} is like DDL{F,S} except that (DN-RS )
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boggling’ [29] question whether everything or nothing is obligatory in impossible cir-
cumstances. DDL{F+,S} and DDL{F,S−} are sound (cf. [14], also Arrow’s axiom: if
bestP (‖C∨D‖)∩‖C‖ = ∅, then bestP (‖C‖) = bestP (‖C∨D‖)∩‖C‖, is helpful). I have
no counterexample to compactness, so the semantics might just be compact. Weak com-
pleteness is easily obtained from the previous constructions, but seems not to have been
stated before, so I shall give the proof in full.
Theorem 5 (Completeness of DDL{F+,S} and DDL{F,S−}). The systems DDL{F+,S} and
DDL{F,S−} are weakly complete with respect to the above multiplex preference semantics.
Proof. In proving DDL{F,S}-completeness, up till the coincidence lemma no use was made
use of unrestricted (DPF ) and (DNS ) missing in DDL{F+,S} and DDL{F,S−} respectively.
So we can reuse and continue that construction with all pertaining lemmas in the canon-
ical construction for DDL{F+,S} and DDL{F,S−}, with the implicit understanding that for
DDL{F+,S} the index meant is F+ rather than F , and for DDL{F,S−} the index meant is S−
instead of S.
Let F-Chain(⊥), S-Chain(C,⊥), be defined as before, C ∈ C. We only consider ch =
〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 that are in such a set. Let OchDi = Di ∧ ¬Di+1, for any 1 i < n. Note that
Di+1 = Di ∧ ¬O for some O ∈ OFDi ∪ {OSDi }, and 
O→ Di by (CExt∗), so 
PL OchDi ↔O. For any 1 i < j  n:
(S1) ‖Dj‖ ⊆ ‖Di‖
(S2) ‖Dj‖ ∩ ‖OchDi‖ = ∅ (and ‖OchDj ‖ ∩ ‖OchDi‖ = ∅ with CExt∗, j = n)
(S3) n = ∞
(S4) ‖OchD1‖ ∪ · · · ∪ ‖OchDn−1‖ = B
Proof. (S1) and (S2) are immediate from (E1) and the definition of ch. n is finite (S3)
since r(L δPL) is finite and repetitions in ch are excluded. For (S4),
B\∥∥OchD1∥∥∪ · · · ∪ ∥∥OchDn∥∥= ∥∥Dn−1 ∧ ¬OchDn−1∥∥= ∥∥Dn−1 ∧ (Dn−1 → Dn)∥∥
and Dn = ⊥ by definition.
For any ch = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉, v, v′ ∈ B, let Pch be such that
vPchv
′ iff v ∈ ‖OchDi‖, v′ ∈ ‖OchDj ‖, i  j < n
By (S2) and (S4), each v must belong to exactly one sphere. The index of each Ci is
transitive and connected, so Pch is as well. LA holds due to (S3) and (S4).
Let ch = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 be as described above. Let Di be its “smallest A-permitting
sphere”, i.e., a Di with ‖OchDi‖ ∩ ‖A‖ = ∅ and ∀j , 1 j < i < n: ‖OchDj ‖ ∩ ‖A‖ = ∅ (we
write DA for Di ). We then obtain, for any ch and A = ⊥:
(S5) There is a DA ∈ ch,
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(S7) bestPch(‖A‖) = ‖OchDA‖ ∩ ‖A‖.
Proof. (S5) is immediate from (S1), (S4) and D1 = . For (S6) let DA = Di ∈ ch, 1 i <
n: If ‖A‖  ‖DA‖, then A∧¬DA = ⊥, so by (S5) there is a DA∧¬DA = Dj ∈ ch. If DA =
DA∧¬DA , then ‖OchDA‖ = ‖OchDA∧¬DA‖, by construction 
PL O
ch
DA
→ DA, so ‖OchDA∧¬DA‖ ∩‖A∧¬DA‖ = ∅ contrary to the definition of DA∧¬DA . If i < j , then ‖DA∧¬DA‖ ⊆ ‖DA‖,
but then ‖DA∧¬DA‖ ∩ ‖A ∧ ¬DA‖ = ∅ and again ‖OchDA∧¬DA‖ ∩ ‖A ∧ ¬DA‖ = ∅. So
j < i, but then ‖OchDA‖ ∩ ‖A ∧ ¬DA‖ = ∅ implies ‖OchDA‖ ∩ ‖A‖ = ∅, so DA was not the
smallest A-permitting sphere. (S7) then follows from the definitions of OchDA and Pch.
Finally, let P = {Pch | ch ∈ F-Chain(⊥) ∪⋃C∈C S-Chain(C,⊥)}. Note that P = ∅: by
(D1)  ∈ C, so even if  ∧O = ⊥ for all O ∈ OF ∪OS, then 〈,⊥〉 ∈ F-Chain(⊥),〈,⊥〉 ∈ S-Chain(,⊥), hence P〈,⊥〉 = B × B ∈ P. So P is as required.
The next lemma holds for all A ∈ r(L δPL), A = ⊥ and P ∈ P and saves us from having
to do separate proofs for the two systems:
(S8) bestP (‖A‖) ⊆ ‖B‖ iff ∃v ∈ ‖A∧B‖: ∀v′ ∈ ‖A∧ ¬B‖: not v′Pv.
Proof. Assume bestP (‖A‖) ⊆ ‖B‖: A = ⊥, so bestP (‖A‖) = ∅ due to (LA). So ∃v ∈
bestP (‖A‖) s.t. v ∈ ‖A∧B‖. Suppose v′Pv for some v′ ∈ ‖A∧¬B‖: so v′ ∈ ‖A‖ and v′ ∈
bestP (‖A‖) by transitivity of P and definition of best. But then bestP (‖A‖)∩ ‖¬B‖ = ∅,
contradicting the assumption. Assume ∃v ∈ ‖A ∧ B‖: ∀v′ ∈ ‖A ∧ ¬B‖: not v′Pv, and
for r.a.a. suppose that bestP (‖A‖) ∩ ‖¬B‖ = ∅: So ∃v′ ∈ bestP (‖A‖) ∩ ‖¬B‖. Then v′ ∈
‖A ∧ ¬B‖ by definition of best, and not v′Pv, as assumed. But v ∈ ‖A‖, so v′Pv by
definition of best, which completes the r.a.a.
Lemma 2 (Coincidence lemma). For all A,B ∈ r(L δPL):
P |= OF (A/B) iff OF (A/B) ∈ ∆
P |= OS(A/B) iff OF (A/B) ∈ ∆
Proof. Coincidence for OF .
Case B = ⊥. If B = ⊥, then in the case of DDL{F+,S}, OF+(/⊥) ∈ ∆ holds due to
(DNF+ ), so OF+(A/⊥) ∈ ∆ due to (CExtF+ ). Also, if B = ⊥, then for any
P ∈ P, bestP (‖B‖) = ∅. P = ∅, so ∃P ∈ P: bestP (‖B‖) ⊆ ‖A‖ holds for any
A, and both sides of the iff-clause are true, and so is the iff-clause. In the case of
DDL{F,S−}, if B = ⊥, then PF (/⊥) ∈ ∆ due to (DPF ), so PF (¬A/⊥) ∈ ∆
due to (CExtF ), and so by definition of ∆, OF (A/⊥) /∈ ∆. Also, if B = ⊥,
then ‖A ∧ B‖ = ∅, so for any P there is no v ∈ ‖A ∧ B‖ such that ∀v′ ∈
‖A ∧ ¬B‖: not v′Pv. So both sides of the iff-clause are false, and the iff-clause
true.
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PL OB → A, so by (C6)
∃OCB ∈ OFCB : OCB ∧ B = OB . Since CB ∈ C, there is a ch ∈ F-Chain(⊥) such
that ch = 〈D1, . . . ,Di,Di+1, . . . ,Dn〉, 1  i < n, D1 = , Di = CB , Di+1 =
C ∧ ¬OCB , and Dn = ⊥. By definition OchDi =OCB . For any 1 j < i, ‖OchDj ‖ ∩
‖CB‖ = ∅ due to (S2), so also ‖OchDj ‖ ∩ ‖B‖ = ∅, and ‖OchDi‖ ∩ ‖B‖ = ∅, for
otherwise OCB ∧B = ⊥ =OB , by (B2) OF (⊥/B) ∈ ∆, and by (DP-RF ) B = ⊥,
contrary to what was assumed. So Di = DB , and bestPch(‖B‖) = ‖OchDB‖∩‖B‖ =
‖OCB ∧B‖ = ‖OB‖, and so bestPch(‖B‖) ⊆ ‖A‖ and by (S8) P |= OF (A/B).
Left-to-right. Suppose P |= OF (A/B), so ∃P ∈ P: bestP (‖B‖) ⊆ ‖A‖ by (S8).
By construction there is some ch = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 such that P = Pch, ch ∈
F-Chain(⊥) or ch ∈ S-Chain(C,⊥) for some C ∈ C. As B = ⊥, by (S5) there is
some ‘smallest B-permitting sphere’ DB in ch, with bestP (‖B‖) = ‖OchDB‖∩‖B‖
and ‖OchDB‖ ∩ ‖B‖ = ∅. Either DB ∈ C and OchDB ∈ OFDB : then {DB →OchDB } PL
¬B , so OF (DB →OchDB/B) ∈ ∆ by (C7), 
PL B → DB by (S6), so OF (OchDB ∧
B/B) ∈ ∆ with (CExtF ) and OF (A/B) ∈ ∆ by (RWF ). Or OchDB = OSDB , so
OS(OchDB/DB) ∈ ∆, and OS(B → A/DB) ∈ ∆ by (RWS ). Assume OF (A/B) /∈
∆, then PF (¬A/B) ∈ ∆ by definition of ∆, so PF (¬(B → A)/B) ∈ ∆ by
(CExtF ), and so with (FH+SSF ) we obtain OS((B → A) ∧ ¬B/DB) ∈ ∆, so
by definition 
PL OSDA → ¬B , but then ‖OchDA‖ ∩ ‖B‖ = ∅, contrary to what was
assumed. So OF (A/B) ∈ ∆.
Coincidence for OS .
Case B = ⊥. If B = ⊥, then in the case of DDL{F+,S}, OS(/⊥) ∈ ∆ holds due to
(DNS ), so OS(A/⊥) ∈ ∆ due to (CExtS ). Also, if B = ⊥, then for any P ∈ P,
bestP (‖B‖) = ∅, so for all P ∈ P: bestP (‖B‖) ⊆ ‖A‖ holds for any A, and both
sides of the iff-clause are true, as is the iff-clause. In the case of DDL{F,S−}, if
B = ⊥, then PS(/⊥) ∈ ∆ due to (DPS ), so PS(¬A/⊥) ∈ ∆ due to (CExtS ),
and by definition of ∆, OS(A/⊥) /∈ ∆. Also, if B = ⊥, then ‖A ∧ B‖ = ∅, and
since P = ∅ there is some P for which it is false that ∃v ∈ ‖A ∧ B‖: ∀v′ ∈
‖A ∧ ¬B‖: not v′Pv, so it is not true for all P . So both sides of the iff-clause
are false, and the clause true.
Case B = ⊥. Right-to-left. Assume OS(A/B) ∈ ∆, and for r.a.a. P  OS(A/B), so by
(S8) ∃P ∈ P: bestP (‖B‖) ∩ ‖¬A‖ = ∅. By construction there is some ch =
〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 such that P = Pch, ch ∈ F-Chain(⊥) or ch ∈ S-Chain(C,⊥) for
some C ∈ C. Since B = ⊥, by (S5) there is some ‘smallest B-permitting sphere’
DB in ch, with bestP (‖B‖) = ‖OchDB‖ ∩ ‖B‖ and ‖OchDB‖ ∩ ‖B‖ = ∅. Either
DB ∈ C and OchDB ∈ OFDB , or OchDB = OSDB : In both cases, since 
PL B → DB
by (S6), we have OS(B → A/DB) ∈ ∆ from OS(A/B) ∈ ∆ and (CondS ), and
{OchDB } 
PL B → A either by (DCSF) and minimality of OchDB ∈ OFDB , or by defin-
ition of OSDB . So ‖OchDB‖ ∩ ‖B‖ = bestP (‖B‖) ⊆ ‖A‖, which completes the r.a.a.
Left-to-right. Suppose P |= OS(A/B), OS(A/B) /∈ ∆, so PS(¬A/B) ∈ ∆.
508 J. Hansen / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 484–511B = ⊥, so CB ∈ C by (C4), so let ch = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉 be in S-Chain(CB,⊥).
Then DB = CB : Suppose DB = Di and CB = Dj for j < i. By construction
of ch, OchDj = OSCB , and OSCB ∧ B = ⊥ for otherwise OSB = ⊥ by (C6), which
with (DP-RS ) derives B = ⊥, but this was excluded. So ‖OSCB‖ ∩ ‖B‖ = ∅,
so DB is not the ‘smallest B-permitting sphere’. Suppose DB = Di and CB =
Dj for j > i, then ‖CB‖ ∩ ‖OchDB‖ = ∅ by (S2), as 
PL B → CB by (C4F ),
‖B‖ ∩ ‖OchDB‖ = ∅, and again DB is not the ‘smallest B-permitting sphere’.
So DB = CB and by construction of ch, OchDB = OSCB . Since PS(¬A/B) ∈ ∆,
PL OSB → A follows from (B1) and construction of ∆. With (C5), (S7) we get
‖OSB‖ = ‖OSCB ∧B‖ = ‖OchDB‖ ∩ ‖B‖ = bestPch(‖B‖). So bestPch(‖B‖)  ‖¬A‖
and by (S8) P  OS(A/B), contradicting the assumption.
7. The puzzle is still incomplete
From a complete picture of dyadic deontic reasoning about conflicting imperatives, at
least two pieces are still missing. The first is that an imperative itself may be conditional
in a way irreducible to a material implication in its content: e.g., if I’m to throw rice as
the wedding party leaves the church, but Huey, Dewey and Louie have stolen the bag,
blocking the doors won’t garner me any praise. It has been argued that such conditional
imperatives have two associated propositions, the antecedent and the consequent, and that
obligations are only ‘triggered’, if the antecedents hold, thus providing the opportunity for
norm satisfaction or violation. Secondly, even though weighing out the relevant factors
may not always produce an unequivocal result, imperatives can be ordered by rank of the
issuing authority or normative weight: e.g., finding the victim of an accident on my way
to a crucial appointment, it seems clear what my obligations are and to not be the time for
skeptical or credulous reasoning.
In an attempt to tackle these complexities, Horty [21] proposed the following definition
of the imperatives ‘binding’ in some circumstances A:
Binding(I ,<)(A) =def
{
i ∈I | (1) i ∈ TriggeredI (A),
(2) there is no j ∈ TriggeredI (A) such that
(a) i < j, and
(b) {consequent(i), consequent(j)} 
BL ⊥
}
where TriggeredI (A) =def {i ∈I | A 
BL antecedent(i)}, and < is some strict partial or-
der on I , i < j meaning that i ranks higher than j . The truth of the (skeptical or credulous)
dyadic deontic formula O∗(B/A) is then defined with respect to the set of consequents of
the imperatives in Binding(I ,<)(A).
Yet Horty’s proposal is problematic for several reasons. First, the triggering condi-
tion does not capture all senses in which antecedents may hold. Consider the situation
(C ∨ D) and let I = 〈C ⇒!A,D ⇒!A, !(¬A ∧ B)〉, where for short A ⇒!B means
the imperative with antecedent(A) and consequent(B), !(¬A ∧ B) is the unconditional
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 ⇒! (¬A ∧ B), and the sequence represents the ordering <. Though we
do not know which imperative overrides the weakest imperative !(¬A ∧ B), we know
for sure that it is overridden in these circumstances and so should not be included in
Binding(I ,<)(C ∨ D), but with Horty’s definition it is. I suggest that, for a better defi-
nition of the set TriggeredI (C ∨ D), we need an operation like Makinson and van der
Torre’s [32] ‘basic output’, which is expressly tailored to process such disjunctive inputs
(triggering conditions) intelligibly.
Secondly, the inconsistency check seems both too rigid and not rigid enough. For the
latter, let I1 = 〈!(A ∧ ¬B), !(B ∧ C)〉 and I2 = 〈!((A ∧ ¬B) ∨ D), !¬D, !(B ∧ C)〉: in
both cases more important imperatives are in conflict with the weakest, but it is rejected
only in the first. For the former, let I = 〈C ⇒!¬D,C ⇒! (B ∧ D)〉 and the situation be
(C ∧ D). 〈C ⇒! (B ∧ D)〉 is not in Binding(I ,<)(C ∧ D), its consequent contradicting
that of a more important imperative. But this has become unfulfillable, which intuitively
clears the way for obligatoriness of B . For a solution, I propose to leave inconsistency
checks entirely to the (credulous or skeptical) reasoning strategy defined via sets consistent
with the circumstances C: let each of these include a maximally C-consistent subset of
the most important triggered imperatives’ consequents, a maximal subset of the second
most important triggered imperatives’ consequents that can be C-consistently added to the
former, etc. This is the incremental maximizing employed for belief revision by Brewka
[6] and Nebel [34] (to work, < must be well-founded). Drawing on a parallel result by
Rott [37, Theorem 7], as long as conflicts between incomparable or equally important
imperatives are allowed, the logic for accordingly defined deontic operators should still be
DDL{F,S}.
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